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OPINION OF THE COURT  
_______________ 
 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
Law enforcement officers need both an arrest warrant 
and a search warrant to apprehend a suspect at what they 
know to be a third party’s home.  If the suspect resides at the 
address in question, however, officers need only an arrest 
warrant and a “reason to believe” that the individual is 
present at the time of their entry.  This case sits between these 
two rules and calls on us to decide their critical point of 
inflection: how certain must officers be that a suspect resides 
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at and is present at a particular address before forcing entry 
into a private dwelling? 
A careful examination of the Supreme Court’s Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence reveals that the standard cannot be 
anything less than probable cause.  Because here, law 
enforcement acted on information that fell short of the 
standard, we will vacate the conviction and remand to the 
District Court. 
I.  Background 
A.  Facts 
 In 2010, an arrest warrant was issued for Edguardo 
Rivera,1 a suspect in a homicide case.  Deputy U.S. Marshal 
Gary Duncan, a member of the Dauphin County Fugitive 
Task Force, received information from another law 
enforcement officer and from street informants that Rivera 
was “staying” or “residing” at an address on North 13th Street 
in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.  App. 25–26, 35–36.  With the 
arrest warrant for Rivera in hand, Deputy Marshal Duncan 
and officers from the Harrisburg Bureau of Police and the 
Dauphin County Drug Task Force arrived at the apartment 
and knocked on the door.  They received no response but 
“heard a lot of movement inside,” as well as a phone ring 
once or twice and stop ringing and a dog bark and cease 
barking, giving the officers the impression that a person had 
                                              
 1 The District Court uses a different spelling than the 
party briefs and the court transcripts, referring to the suspect 
as “Edwardo Rivera.” 
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manually silenced the phone and muzzled the dog.  App. 29–
30.  The officers then forcibly entered the home.   
 As it turned out, however, the sought fugitive, Rivera, 
did not live in the apartment and was not present.2  Instead, 
upon entering, the officers saw Appellant Johnny Vasquez-
Algarin, and, during a protective sweep, they identified in 
plain view sandwich baggies, a razor blade, and what 
appeared to be powder cocaine.  After Vasquez-Algarin 
declined to grant consent for a search, one officer obtained a 
search warrant while the other officers waited at the 
apartment.  During the subsequent search conducted pursuant 
to the warrant, the officers discovered ammunition, unused 
plastic bags, and hundreds of small black bands, as well as a 
cell phone in the master bedroom that was later searched 
pursuant to another search warrant.  At some point during the 
search, the officers identified a set of car keys, which they 
used to open a stolen Mazda located across from the 
apartment.  Vasquez-Algarin, who had no outstanding 
warrants, was then arrested. 
B.  Proceedings 
 Vasquez-Algarin and the two brothers with whom he 
shared the apartment were each charged with distribution and 
possession with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)(ii) and conspiracy to do the 
same in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.  In October 2013, 
Vasquez-Algarin pleaded not guilty to the charges. 
                                              
 2 The record contains no evidence of any connection 
between the two men. 
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 The month before trial, Vasquez-Algarin moved to 
suppress the evidence seized from the North 13th Street 
residence, arguing that law enforcement’s forced entry into 
the apartment was unconstitutional.  At his suppression 
hearing, the Government presented three witnesses, all 
officers involved in various stages of Vasquez-Algarin’s 
apprehension and arrest.  Two witnesses, Deputy Marshal 
Duncan and Middletown Borough Police Detective Dennis 
Morris, testified about the sounds that officers heard coming 
from inside the residence on their arrival, but only Deputy 
Marshal Duncan could speak to the circumstances that led 
law enforcement to Vasquez-Algarin’s residence.  
 Deputy Marshal Duncan testified that he had an arrest 
warrant for Edguardo Rivera and was given “reliable” 
information from a detective from the Harrisburg Bureau of 
Police and informants that Rivera lived at the North 13th 
Street address.  App. 25, 26.  During cross-examination, when 
defense counsel pressed Deputy Marshal Duncan to elaborate 
on “the exact factors” that led him to believe that Rivera lived 
at the address, Deputy Marshal Duncan reiterated that he had 
relied on “[i]nformation being provided to me by another law 
enforcement officer, information that we had from informants 
on the street that that address was being used by Mr. Rivera.”  
App. 36.  When counsel asked if, prior to going to the 
residence, Deputy Marshal Duncan had checked records for 
the resident of the apartment, he confirmed that he had but 
was unable to recall whether he had identified the renter of 
the apartment. 
 The District Court denied Vasquez-Algarin’s motion 
to suppress, concluding from Deputy Marshal Duncan and 
Detective Morris’s testimony that the officers had a 
“reasonable belief” and “probable cause to believe” that the 
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fugitive, Rivera, resided at the apartment and was present at 
the time of the officers’ entry and that their entry was 
therefore constitutional.3  United States v. Vasquez-Algarin, 
No. 1:11-CR-0200-01, 2014 WL 1672008, at *1–2 (M.D. Pa. 
Apr. 28, 2014).  At trial the next month, Deputy Marshal 
Duncan provided substantially the same information about 
what had led him to the North 13th Street address to 
apprehend Rivera.4  However, he offered a different answer to 
                                              
 3 At the suppression hearing, there was some question 
as to Vasquez-Algarin’s standing to challenge the search 
because he testified that the apartment was merely rented in 
his name and that he had moved out two months before the 
search, leaving only his dog in the apartment with his 
brothers.  He further represented he was in the apartment at 
the time of the search only because he had received a call 
from the landlord about problems with the rent and 
electricity.  The District Court determined that the master 
bedroom belonged to Vasquez-Algarin, “as he could not 
identify key details related to his alleged other residence, and 
was the individual on the lease of the 142 North 13th Street 
residence and kept possessions therein,” and expressly 
rejected as “not credible” Vasquez-Algarin’s claim that he no 
longer resided at the apartment at the time of the search.  
Vasquez-Algarin, 2014 WL 1672008, at *2 n.2.  In addition, 
Vasquez-Algarin maintained at the suppression hearing that 
he had standing to assert a Fourth Amendment claim, and the 
Government does not now challenge his standing. 
 4 Specifically, at trial Deputy Marshal Duncan testified 
that the U.S. Marshals Service “received information that Mr. 
Rivera could possibly be residing at an address on North 13th 
Street,” App. 136, and that “the information . . . was provided 
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a question he also had been asked at the suppression hearing 
about why he spent significant time knocking and yelling at 
the door.  At the suppression hearing, Deputy Marshal 
Duncan had testified that often residents will not come to the 
door for law enforcement but “if we stay there for a while, 
and you continue to knock and continue to not leave, typically 
you’ll gain some response from somebody inside.”  App. 29.  
In his trial testimony, however, he identified a second reason 
he knocked for so long at the door in this case: “The address 
was not the address of record for Mr. Rivera, so we wanted to 
knock and attempt to gain contact with somebody inside and 
gain their consent to search the address.”  App. 138. 
After a two-day trial, a jury convicted Vasquez-
Algarin on both drug counts.  He now appeals the District 
Court’s denial of his suppression motion.5  We review the 
District Court’s legal conclusions de novo and the underlying 
factual findings for clear error.  United States v. Torres, 534 
F.3d 207, 209 (3d Cir. 2008).  In the present context, where 
we are reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress to 
                                                                                                     
to [him] by a detective from the City of Harrisburg who 
received the information that Mr. Rivera may be staying 
there,” App. 137. 
 5 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3231, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.  Because we vacate the conviction, we do not reach 
the second issue Vasquez-Algarin raises on appeal, whether 
the District Court committed clear error in applying a two-
level sentencing enhancement for Vasquez-Algarin’s role as 
an organizer, leader, manager or supervisor in the criminal 
activity under § 3B1.1(c) of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.   
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determine whether police officers had probable cause to 
believe the subject of their arrest warrant lived in the 
apartment they entered, we may look to the entire record and 
are “not restricted to the evidence presented at the 
suppression hearing where the motion was denied.”  United 
States v. Silveus, 542 F.3d 993, 1001 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting 
Gov’t of the V.I. v. Williams, 739 F.2d 936, 939 (3d Cir. 
1984)). 
II.  Discussion 
 Vasquez-Algarin argues that law enforcement officers 
needed a search warrant to enter the North 13th Street 
apartment because the subject of their arrest warrant (the 
“arrestee”6) did not in fact reside there.  As we will explain 
below, however, their entry was constitutional if they had 
sufficient information to support a reasonable belief that the 
arrestee resided at and was present within the targeted home.  
To determine what reasonable belief requires, we will look to 
the principles set forth in the Supreme Court’s key 
precedents, the views expressed by our sister Circuits and, 
most importantly, the fundamental tenets of Fourth 
                                              
 6 The term “arrestee” is usually used to describe an 
individual who was been arrested, see Black’s Law 
Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining “arrestee” as “[s]omeone 
who has been taken into custody by legal authority; a person 
who has been arrested”), but in the Payton context, the courts 
regularly use the term to refer to the intended target of the 
arrest warrant.  For ease of reference, we use the term in this 
sense throughout the opinion, although the person eventually 
arrested in this case differed from the person named on the 
warrant. 
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Amendment jurisprudence governing the home.  We conclude 
that to satisfy the reasonable belief standard law enforcement 
required, but lacked, probable cause.  The officers’ entry was 
therefore unconstitutional and, because the good-faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule is inapplicable here, the 
evidence seized from Vasquez-Algarin’s apartment should 
have been suppressed. 
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A.  Payton and Steagald 
 The Supreme Court has issued two major decisions 
regarding the constitutionality of in-home arrests.  Because 
here law enforcement officers believed, albeit mistakenly, 
that the home they were entering was the residence of the 
subject of their arrest warrant, the controlling authority is the 
first of these decisions, Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 
(1980).  There, the Supreme Court considered two 
consolidated cases in which police officers entered private 
residences without any kind of warrant to make routine felony 
arrests and held that the state statutes that had authorized 
these warrantless entries were unconstitutional; the officers 
were required to have an arrest warrant to arrest a suspect in 
his home.  Id. at 602–03.  In a dictum that has since evolved 
into a tenet of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court 
also observed that a search warrant would not be required in 
that circumstance because “an arrest warrant founded on 
probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority 
to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is 
reason to believe the suspect is within.”  Id. at 603 (emphasis 
added). 
In the wake of Payton, to assess the constitutionality of 
an officer’s entry into a home to execute an arrest warrant, the 
Courts of Appeals have drawn upon the Supreme Court’s 
language to develop a two-prong test that extends to 
residency: the officer must have a “reasonable belief”7 that 
                                              
 7 Close examination reveals the Courts of Appeals 
have uniformly cast Payton’s “reason to believe” language as 
a reasonable belief standard.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Gorman, 314 F.3d 1105, 1114–15 (9th Cir. 2002).  However, 
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(1) the arrestee resides at the dwelling, and (2) the arrestee is 
present at the time of the entry.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Veal, 453 F.3d 164, 167 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting United States 
v. Gay, 240 F.3d 1222, 1226 (10th Cir. 2001)). 
 A different framework applies, however, where 
officers believe an individual for whom they have an arrest 
warrant is a guest in a third-party home.  A year after handing 
down Payton, the Supreme Court held in Steagald v. United 
States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981), that officers may not enter a 
third party’s residence to execute an arrest warrant without 
first obtaining a search warrant “based on their belief that [the 
suspect] might be a guest there,” unless the search is 
consensual or justified by exigent circumstances.  Id. at 213, 
216.  In so reasoning, the Court rejected the Government’s 
argument as to the “practical problems [that] might arise if 
law enforcement officers are required to obtain a search 
warrant before entering the home of a third party to make an 
arrest,” and concluded that “the inconvenience incurred by 
the police is simply not that significant” and in any event 
“cannot outweigh the constitutional interests at stake.”  Id. at 
220–22. 
Before us is a case of mistaken belief that underscores 
the tension between the residency test that the Courts of 
Appeals have derived from Payton and the relatively robust 
Fourth Amendment protections guaranteed to third-party 
homes under Steagald.8  Because officers may force entry 
                                                                                                     
as discussed infra in Section II.B, they diverge on what that 
standard requires. 
 8 Vasquez-Algarin was not the arrestee sought nor, as 
far as the record shows, connected to the arrestee in any way.  
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into a home as long as they have a reasonable belief the 
suspect resides and is present there, but must have nothing 
short of a search warrant where the suspect is a guest in a 
third party’s home, law enforcement’s assessment of a 
suspect’s residency is, in effect, a determination of the level 
of protection to which a dwelling is entitled.  Our choice 
about how much and what kind of information must form the 
basis for that critical determination thus affects not only the 
homes of arrestees but also any home that could be mistaken 
for one.  For that reason, we must draw not only from the 
principles laid out in Payton but also from those set forth in 
Steagald when determining just how stringent the reasonable 
belief standard must be.  With these principles in mind, we 
next consider our own precedent relevant to this issue and the 
case law of our sister Circuits that have addressed the issue 
squarely, but with divergent results. 
B.  The reasonable belief standard 
Vasquez-Algarin contends that this Court has already 
equated “reason to believe” or “reasonable belief” with a 
probable cause standard, and the District Court appears to 
have assumed probable cause applied as well.  Vasquez-
Algarin, 2014 WL 1672008, at *1.  The issue, however, 
remains an open question in our Circuit.   
                                                                                                     
This distinguishes this case from any of our relevant 
precedents and from many of the cases in which other Courts 
of Appeals have had occasion to interpret and apply the 
Payton reasonable belief standard.  See, e.g., Veal, 453 F.3d 
164 (defendant was the intended arrestee); United States v. 
Agnew, 407 F.3d 193 (3d Cir. 2005) (same). 
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Vazquez-Algarin is correct that we treated reasonable 
belief and probable cause as equivalent in United States v. 
Agnew, 407 F.3d 193 (3d Cir. 2005).  There, in applying the 
Payton reasonable belief test, we observed that “police may 
enter a suspect’s residence to make an arrest armed only with 
an arrest warrant if they have probable cause to believe that 
the suspect is in the home.”  Id. at 196.  Yet in that case the 
government possessed sufficient information to meet the 
standard irrespective of its precise definition, so we had no 
occasion to analyze the point and it had no effect on our 
holding.  Recognizing as much, we observed the following 
year in Veal that although “[o]ur Court . . . has described the 
test using the language of ‘probable cause,’” the courts had 
taken different approaches to the question, and we decided, 
under these circumstances, that we would “determine whether 
a possibly lower standard of reasonable belief should be 
applied” another day.  453 F.3d at 167 n.3. 
That day has arrived.  Because a number of our sister 
Circuits have opined on this issue, we review their 
approaches for their persuasive value before staking out our 
own.  As described below, these approaches vary widely:  
Although the Courts of Appeals once overwhelmingly 
interpreted reasonable belief as less stringent than probable 
cause, they are now nearly evenly divided on this point.9 
                                              
9 In the last decade, a number of Courts of Appeals 
have expressed agreement with the Ninth Circuit’s 
longstanding view that reasonable belief amounts to probable 
cause.  See United States v. Harper, 928 F.2d 894, 897 (9th 
Cir. 1991), overruled on other grounds by United States v. 
King, 687 F.3d 1189, 1189 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per 
curiam); accord United States v. Jackson, 576 F.3d 465, 469 
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The D.C., First, Second and Tenth Circuits have 
determined that reasonable belief requires less than probable 
cause.10  See United States v. Thomas, 429 F.3d 282, 286 
(D.C. Cir. 2005); United States v. Werra, 638 F.3d 326, 337 
(1st Cir. 2011); United States v. Lauter, 57 F.3d 212, 215 (2d 
Cir. 1995); Valdez v. McPheters, 172 F.3d 1220, 1224–25 
(10th Cir. 1999).  But those courts have offered little by way 
of explanation for this interpretation.  In Thomas, the D.C. 
Circuit observed that, to date, most of the appellate courts had 
determined that reasonable belief is a less stringent standard 
than probable cause and that it was “more likely . . . that the 
Supreme Court in Payton used a phrase other than ‘probable 
cause’ because it meant something other than ‘probable 
cause.’”  429 F.3d at 286.  In Valdez, the Tenth Circuit 
offered a more detailed explanation for its adoption of a 
standard less stringent than probable cause, but rather than 
explaining why probable cause would be inappropriate, the 
court focused entirely on the impracticability of imposing on 
                                                                                                     
(7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Hardin, 539 F.3d 404, 416 & 
n.6 (6th Cir. 2008); see also United States v. Barrera, 464 
F.3d 496, 501 & n.5 (5th Cir. 2006) (equating the two terms 
and describing the disagreement among the appellate courts 
as “semantic”); United States v. Route, 104 F.3d 59, 62 (5th 
Cir. 1997) (analogizing reasonable belief to probable cause 
but ultimately rejecting the latter standard). 
10 Even those courts that agree that reasonable belief is 
a lower standard than probable cause disagree on its precise 
definition.  Compare, e.g., Gay, 240 F.3d at 1227 (describing 
reasonable belief and reasonable suspicion as “two different 
legal standards”); with Werra, 638 F.3d at 337 (equating 
reasonable belief to reasonable suspicion). 
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officers an “actual knowledge” requirement, which none of 
the Courts of Appeals has imposed in applying Payton.  See 
Valdez, 172 F.3d at 1224–25 (10th Cir. 1999) (criticizing the 
Ninth Circuit’s adoption of the probable cause standard in 
part because “requiring actual knowledge of the suspect’s true 
residence would effectively make Payton a dead letter”).  But 
see United States v. Hill, 649 F.3d 258, 274 (4th Cir. 2011) 
(Agee, J., dissenting) (“[N]o court applying [Payton] has ever 
held[] that the police must have seen the defendant nearby or 
have actual knowledge that he is inside a residence before 
they can enter.”); United States v. Magluta, 44 F.3d 1530, 
1535 (11th Cir. 1995) (“[P]robable cause itself is a doctrine of 
reasonable probability and not certainty.”). 
The Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits have 
endorsed—or, in the case of the Seventh Circuit, “inclined” 
toward—interpreting reasonable belief as the equivalent, or 
functional equivalent, of probable cause.  See United States v. 
Barrera, 464 F.3d 496, 500-01 & n.5 (5th Cir. 2006); United 
States v. Hardin, 539 F.3d 404, 415–16 & n.6 (6th Cir. 2008); 
United States v. Jackson, 576 F.3d 465, 469 (7th Cir. 2009); 
United States v. Gorman, 314 F.3d 1105, 1114–15 (9th Cir. 
2002). 11  To reach this conclusion, some of these Courts of 
Appeals have looked to the Supreme Court’s own post-
                                              
 11 The Sixth Circuit has reconsidered its position on 
the issue.  In Hardin, the Sixth Circuit rejected as dictum its 
previous determination in United States v. Pruitt that 
reasonable belief is a less stringent standard than probable 
cause, and, in new dictum, endorsed Judge Clay’s concurring 
opinion in Pruitt that equated the two standards.  Hardin, 539 
F.3d at 415 & n.6 (citing United States v. Pruitt, 458 F.3d 
477, 490 (6th Cir. 2006) (Clay, J., concurring)). 
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Payton characterization of its “reason to believe” language, as 
well as the terms with which the Court has generally defined 
the probable cause standard. 
Most notably, in Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 
(1990), when considering whether officers executing a home 
arrest pursuant to Payton could also perform a protective 
sweep of the residence, the Supreme Court concluded that 
“[p]ossessing an arrest warrant and probable cause to believe 
Buie was in his home, the officers were entitled to enter and 
to search anywhere in the house in which Buie might be 
found.”  Id. at 332–33 (emphasis added).  According to the 
Sixth and Ninth Circuits, this passage is most naturally read 
to mean that the Supreme Court intended the Payton “reason 
to believe” language to serve as a reference to probable cause.  
See Hardin, 539 F.3d at 416 n.6 (“Had the Court truly 
intended the ‘reason to believe’ language in Payton to set 
forth a new, lesser standard, surely the Court in Buie would 
have explained that the officers were entitled to be inside 
Buie’s residence on the basis of an arrest warrant and a 
‘reasonable belief’ as to Buie’s presence, but the Court used 
the term ‘probable cause’ instead.”); accord Gorman, 314 
F.3d at 1114.12  
                                              
12 As these courts have pointed out, Justice White’s 
description of the majority opinion in his dissent in Payton 
provides additional support for interpreting Payton’s “reason 
to believe” language as a reference to probable cause.  
Hardin, 539 F.3d at 410; Gorman, 314 F.3d at 1114 & n.10.  
His disagreement with the majority was predicated in part on 
his understanding that “under [the majority’s] decision, the 
officers apparently need an extra increment of probable cause 
when executing the arrest warrant, namely, grounds to believe 
17 
 
As further evidence that reasonable belief amounts to 
probable cause, some of these Courts of Appeals have also 
considered the Supreme Court’s tendency to explain and 
define the term “probable cause” using “grammatical 
analogues” of “reason to believe.”  Hardin, 539 F.3d at 416 
n.6 (citing Pruitt, 458 F.3d at 490 (Clay, J., concurring)).  For 
example, the Court has described probable cause as requiring 
a “reasonable ground for belief.”  Pruitt, 458 F.3d at 490 
(Clay, J., concurring) (quoting Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 
366, 370–71 (2003); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 
(1979)); see also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243 (1983) 
(suggesting that “probable cause” is synonymous with 
“‘reasonable grounds’ to believe”).  
Among the Courts of Appeals that have equated 
reasonable belief with probable cause, the Fifth Circuit is 
notable in that it has also concluded that “the courts that 
distinguish the terms have done so because ‘probable cause’ 
is a term of art.”  See Barrera, 464 F.3d at 501 & n.5 (citing 
United States v. Woods, 560 F.2d 660 (5th Cir. 1977); United 
States v. Route, 104 F.3d 59, 62 (5th Cir. 1997)).  We do not 
necessarily agree with the suggestion in Barrera that the 
disagreement among the Circuits as to whether reasonable 
belief equates to probable cause is “more about semantics 
than substance.”  Id.  The D.C. Circuit, for instance, appears 
to require significantly less evidence to support a belief of 
residency than the other Courts of Appeals, presumably in 
part as a result of its choice to depart from the probable cause 
standard and the protections it affords.  See, e.g., Thomas, 429 
F.3d at 286 (holding that officers had requisite reasonable 
                                                                                                     
that the suspect is within the dwelling.”  Payton, 445 U.S. at 
616 n.13 (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
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belief to enter residence where arresting marshals provided no 
testimony about where they had obtained the parolee’s 
address except to say that an “investigation was done” and the 
address “turned up”).   
We do agree with the Fifth Circuit, however, that 
probable cause has specialized usage and is not a standard 
typically applied by police to settle a question of the kind 
before us about where an individual lives.13  Although the 
Supreme Court has long insisted on a “practical, 
nontechnical” definition of probable cause, Gates, 462 U.S. at 
231 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 
(1949)), describing it as a “fluid concept” that defies 
“reduc[tion] to a neat set of legal rules,” id. at 232, the 
fluidity of the concept has not translated into diverse 
application.  A close reading of the case law shows that the 
Supreme Court uses the “probable cause” standard almost 
exclusively to assess the basis and strength of an officer or 
                                              
 13 The awkwardness that the Fifth Circuit has 
identified, of applying the probable cause standard in the 
Payton context, see Route, 104 F.3d at 62, may be a function 
of the appellate courts’ recasting of the Payton “reason to 
believe” standard—which the Supreme Court used to describe 
only whether the arrestee was present within the residence—
as a two-part test in which that same standard governs both 
whether the dwelling is the arrestee’s residence and whether 
the arrestee is inside.  Applying the probable cause standard 
to determine only whether the arrestee is present within the 
home presents no such difficulties.  Cf. Steagald, 451 U.S. at 
213–14 n.7 (“[T]he plain wording of the Fourth Amendment 
admits of no exemption from the warrant requirement when 
the search of a home is for a person rather than for a thing.”). 
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magistrate’s belief that a particular person has committed a 
particular crime or that an article subject to seizure can be 
found at a particular location—in short, whether criminal 
activity is afoot.  See, e.g., Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175 (“The 
substance of all the definitions of probable cause is a 
reasonable ground for belief of guilt.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
The Supreme Court’s general practice of reserving 
probable cause language to these circumstances perhaps helps 
account for the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits’ decision to 
simply treat reasonable belief as its own standard for purposes 
of applying the Payton test.  The Eleventh Circuit in Magluta, 
observing that “it is difficult to define the Payton ‘reason to 
believe’ standard, or to compare the quantum of proof the 
standard requires with the proof that probable cause requires,” 
side-stepped the comparison altogether and treated the inquiry 
as, in essence, its own reasonableness determination.  44 F.3d 
at 1535–36 (citing Woods, 560 F.2d at 665); accord United 
States v. Risse, 83 F.3d 212, 216–17 (8th Cir. 1996) 
(employing a similar test and citing Magluta).14  Relying on 
the same case law as the Fifth Circuit in Barrera, the 
Eleventh Circuit thus opted for a “practical interpretation of 
Payton” that resembles probable cause in that “in order for 
law enforcement officials to enter a residence to execute an 
arrest warrant for a resident of the premises, the facts and 
                                              
14 Although Woods predated Payton, the Eleventh 
Circuit has deemed the cases consistent.  Magluta, 44 F.3d at 
1536.  Decisions of the former Fifth Circuit rendered prior to 
October 1, 1981, are precedent in the Eleventh Circuit.  
Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 
1981) (en banc). 
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circumstances within the knowledge of the law enforcement 
agents, when viewed in the totality, must warrant a reasonable 
belief that the location to be searched is the suspect’s 
dwelling, and that the suspect is within the residence at the 
time of entry.”  Magluta, 44 F.3d at 1535; cf. Gates, 462 U.S. 
at 238 (explaining that, for purposes of a probable cause 
determination, a “totality of the circumstances” analysis 
requires the magistrate issuing a warrant “simply to make a 
practical, common-sense decision whether . . . there is a fair 
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be 
found in a particular place.”). 
C.  Reasonable belief as probable cause 
 Having considered the different approaches of our 
sister Circuits and their reasoning where provided, we join the 
Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits in holding that 
Payton’s “reason to believe” language amounts to a probable 
cause standard.15  As explained more fully below, we do so 
for two reasons.  First, the Supreme Court’s use of the phrase 
“reason to believe,” when considered in the context of Payton 
and more generally the Court’s Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence, supports a probable cause standard.  Second, 
and more fundamentally, requiring that law enforcement 
                                              
 15 The Seventh Circuit has stated its “inclin[ation] to 
adopt the view . . . that ‘reasonable belief’ is synonymous 
with probable cause,” Jackson, 576 F.3d at 469, and the Sixth 
Circuit has endorsed the view that the two standards are 
synonymous in what it conceded was dictum, Hardin, 539 
F.3d at 415–16 & n.6. 
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officers have probable cause to believe their suspect resides at 
and is present within the dwelling before making a forced 
entry is the only conclusion commensurate with the 
constitutional protections the Supreme Court has accorded to 
the home. 
 We consider first the Court’s use of the term “reason 
to believe” in Payton and other criminal cases.  On careful 
reading, Payton appears to be a case in which the Court used 
the terms “probable cause” and “reason to believe” in close 
proximity and interchangeably.  This is readily apparent when 
we examine how the Payton Court couched its analysis.  
Expressly “put[ting] to one side related problems that are not 
presented today,” the Court noted that neither of the 
consolidated cases before it in Payton involved exigent 
circumstances or consent, the home of a third party, or 
allegations “that the police lacked probable cause to believe 
that the suspect was at home when they entered.”  Payton, 
445 U.S. at 582–84.  It is within this carefully bounded 
factual framework—the search of an arrestee’s home without 
exigent circumstances or consent but with probable cause to 
believe he was present—that the Court concluded its decision 
with the observation that “an arrest warrant founded on 
probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority 
to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is 
reason to believe the suspect is within.”  Id. at 603. 
 Payton is not an anomaly.  On several occasions, the 
Supreme Court has used the very same “reason to believe” 
language that appears in Payton as a stand-in for “probable 
cause.”  For example, in the landmark case Berger v. New 
York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), where the Court held that the 
wiretapping statute in question violated the Fourth 
Amendment because it authorized suspicionless 
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eavesdropping, the Court explained that “[t]he purpose of the 
probable cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment [is] to 
keep the state out of constitutionally protected areas until it 
has reason to believe that a specific crime has been or is 
being committed.”  Id. at 59 (emphases added).  In Gerstein v. 
Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), the Court likewise observed that 
at common law the justice of the peace would “determine 
whether there was reason to believe the prisoner had 
committed a crime” and that this “initial determination of 
probable cause” could be reviewed on a writ of habeas 
corpus.  Id. at 114–15.  And in Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 
583 (1974) (plurality opinion), after recounting all of the 
evidence that established that police had “probable cause to 
search [the suspect’s] car,” the Court concluded that the 
resulting composite “provided reason to believe that the car 
was used in the commission of the crime.”  Id. at 592.  
Examples of this kind serve to undercut the D.C. Circuit’s 
conclusion that Payton’s “reason to believe” should be 
construed loosely simply because the Court elected to use a 
phrase other than “probable cause” to describe the requisite 
belief law enforcement must have that an arrestee is present 
in his dwelling at the time of the search.  Thomas, 429 F.3d at 
286. 
 Although the language of Payton and the Supreme 
Court’s other Fourth Amendment decisions provides strong 
support for interpreting reasonable belief as a probable cause 
standard, it is the nature of the privacy interests at stake that 
solidifies our conclusion.16  Without question, the home takes 
                                              
 16 We recognize that there are limits to parsing 
language alone to determine what the Supreme Court 
intended by its use of the phrase “reason to believe” in 
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pride of place in our constitutional jurisprudence.  As the 
Supreme Court has reiterated on numerous occasions, “when 
it comes to the Fourth Amendment, the home is first among 
equals.  At the Amendment’s ‘very core’ stands ‘the right of a 
man to retreat into his own home and there be free from 
                                                                                                     
Payton, because the Court has not adhered to hard and fast 
rules when using “reasonableness” language.  For example, 
the Court has sometimes referred to “reasonable belief” when 
discussing “reasonable suspicion,” see, e.g., Buie, 494 U.S. at 
336–37; United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703–04 (1983), 
a practice that has been cited by at least one Court of Appeals 
to suggest Payton may require less than probable cause, see, 
e.g., Pruitt, 458 F.3d at 484.  The Court’s references to 
“reasonable belief” outside the Payton context, however, have 
little relevance to our inquiry, particularly as the phrase 
“reasonable belief” does not actually appear in Payton and 
using it as shorthand for “reason to believe” is an adaptation 
of the Courts of Appeals.  Conversely, our holding today that 
the “reason to believe” or short-hand “reasonable belief” 
standard equates to probable cause is limited to the Payton 
context and should not be construed to mean that “reasonable 
belief,” “reasonable grounds to believe,” or a substantially 
similar iteration means probable cause in other circumstances.  
While the Supreme Court has occasionally discussed 
reasonable suspicion in terms of “reasonable belief,” for 
example, reasonable suspicion is “obviously less demanding” 
than probable cause, United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 
(1989), and nothing we have said today bears on that line of 
cases, see, e.g., United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002); 
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990); Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1 (1968). 
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unreasonable governmental intrusion.’”  Florida v. Jardines, 
133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013) (quoting Silverman v. United 
States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).  Indeed, such intrusion is 
“the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth 
Amendment is directed.”  Payton, 445 U.S. at 585. 
 The vaunted place of the home in our constitutional 
privacy jurisprudence was central to the Supreme Court’s 
analysis in Payton and Steagald.  See, e.g., Payton, 445 U.S. 
at 585–90; Steagald, 451 U.S. at 220, 222.  These cases 
together provide insight that neither case provides alone—
insight that leads inexorably to the conclusion that the 
Circuit-created two-prong test is workable only if governed 
by a robust reasonableness standard akin to probable cause, 
and that anything less would defeat the “stringent . . . 
protection” the home is due.  United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976) (private homes are 
“ordinarily afforded the most stringent Fourth Amendment 
protection”). 
 On one hand, adopting a too-rigorous interpretation of 
“reason to believe” seems at odds with the portion of Payton 
leading up to the Court’s articulation of the “reason to 
believe” rule: 
It is true that an arrest warrant requirement may 
afford less protection than a search warrant 
requirement, but it will suffice to interpose the 
magistrate's determination of probable cause 
between the zealous officer and the citizen.  If 
there is sufficient evidence of a citizen’s 
participation in a felony to persuade a judicial 
officer that his arrest is justified, it is 
constitutionally reasonable to require him to 
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open his doors to the officers of the law.  Thus, 
for Fourth Amendment purposes, an arrest 
warrant founded on probable cause implicitly 
carries with it the limited authority to enter a 
dwelling in which the suspect lives when there 
is reason to believe the suspect is within. 
Payton, 445 U.S. at 602–03 (emphasis added).  This language 
seems to cut against interpreting the “reason to believe” 
standard too stringently insofar as the Court clearly indicates 
that the probable cause determination required for an arrest 
warrant already offers much of the requisite protection.  
Payton, by its terms, however, applies only with respect to an 
individual for whom an arrest warrant has been issued and 
with respect to the place where he resides.  See id. at 583. 
On the other hand, where there is uncertainty about 
where the arrestee resides—a situation not presented in 
Payton but encompassed within the Circuit-created two-prong 
test—we must take care not to adopt an interpretation of 
“reason to believe” that requires of law enforcement so little 
evidence that an arrestee resides at a dwelling as to expose all 
dwellings to an unacceptable risk of police error and 
warrantless entry.  Here, Steagald comes into play, for to 
adopt such an interpretation would be to disregard the 
explanation the Court provides there for why it chose to 
distinguish Payton and to conclude, in effect, that the homes 
of fugitives and non-fugitives are entitled to different degrees 
of Fourth Amendment protection: 
Because an arrest warrant authorizes the police 
to deprive a person of his liberty, it necessarily 
also authorizes a limited invasion of that 
person’s privacy interest when it is necessary to 
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arrest him in his home.  This analysis, however, 
is plainly inapplicable when the police seek to 
use an arrest warrant as legal authority to enter 
the home of a third party to conduct a search.  
Such a warrant embodies no judicial 
determination whatsoever regarding the person 
whose home is to be searched.  Because it does 
not authorize the police to deprive the third 
person of his liberty, it cannot embody any 
derivative authority to deprive this person of his 
interest in the privacy of his home.  Such a 
deprivation must instead be based on an 
independent showing that a legitimate object of 
a search is located in the third party’s home.  
We have consistently held, however, that such a 
determination is the province of the magistrate, 
and not that of the police officer. 
Steagald, 451 U.S. at 214 n.7 (emphasis added).  Like 
Payton, Steagald does not contemplate the possibility of 
uncertain residency, nor does it address the proper means of 
resolving that uncertainty.  But read alongside Payton, the 
Court’s reasoning in Steagald makes clear that its 
determination of the legality of a forced home entry in this 
context turns on whether the officer has the benefit of some 
type of probable cause determination by a neutral arbiter, be 
that by way of an arrest warrant or search warrant.  
 Given this precedent and the constitutional principles 
at stake, law enforcement armed with only an arrest warrant 
may not force entry into a home based on anything less than 
probable cause to believe an arrestee resides at and is then 
present within the residence.  A laxer standard would effect 
an end-run around the stringent baseline protection 
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established in Steagald and render all private homes—the 
most sacred of Fourth Amendment spaces—susceptible to 
search by dint of mere suspicion or uncorroborated 
information and without the benefit of any judicial 
determination.  Such intrusions are “the chief evil against 
which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.”  
Payton, 445 U.S. at 585.  We therefore join those Courts of 
Appeals that have held that reasonable belief in the Payton 
context “embodies the same standard of reasonableness 
inherent in probable cause.”  Gorman, 314 F.3d at 1111; 
accord Barrera, 464 F.3d at 501.   
D.  Application 
 Having defined the reasonable belief standard as 
equivalent to probable cause, we have no trouble concluding 
that law enforcement did not meet that standard as to either 
prong of the Payton test here, and the District Court erred in 
concluding otherwise.   
 To make a probable cause determination, we must 
consider the “totality of the circumstances,” Silveus, 542 F.3d 
at 1000 (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 238), which, in the context 
of second-hand information, encompasses considerations 
such as the basis and reliability of the information and the 
receiving officer’s ability to corroborate its content, United 
States v. Ritter, 416 F.3d 256, 262–64 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing 
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990)). 
 Here, to meet Payton’s first prong, Deputy Marshal 
Duncan relied entirely on informant tips and the word of 
another detective but provided little information by which the 
District Court could assess the information he obtained.  At 
the suppression hearing, Deputy Marshal Duncan explained 
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only that he had based his belief that the intended arrestee, 
Rivera, lived at the North 13th Street address on information 
conveyed to him by another officer and by informants.  He 
did not identify the number of informants, their reliability 
based on any prior interactions he may have had with them, 
the specific information they related, or even whether he 
obtained information from “informants on the street” first-
hand or through the other officer.  App. 36.  Nor did he 
describe with any specificity the information provided by that 
other officer or the basis for that officer’s statement.  See 
Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 568 (1971) (“[A]n 
otherwise illegal arrest cannot be insulated from challenge by 
the decision of the instigating officer to rely on fellow 
officers to make the arrest.”); Rogers v. Powell, 120 F.3d 446, 
453 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[S]tatements by fellow officers 
conveying that there is probable cause for a person’s arrest, 
by themselves, cannot provide the “facts and circumstances” 
necessary to support a finding of probable cause . . . . The 
legality of a seizure based solely on statements issued by 
fellow officers depends on whether the officers who issued 
the statements possessed the requisite basis to seize the 
suspect.”). 
 In his trial testimony, moreover, Deputy Marshal 
Duncan cast further doubt on the reasonableness of his belief 
that the dwelling was Rivera’s residence when he explained 
that the officers knocked vigorously and waited at the door 
for a prolonged period in part because “[t]he address was not 
the address of record for Mr. Rivera, so we wanted to knock 
and attempt to gain contact with somebody inside and gain 
their consent to search the address.”  App. 138.  This 
explanation suggests that, at the time of entry, Deputy 
Marshal Duncan not only had limited basis to believe Rivera 
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resided at the apartment but also possessed evidence that gave 
him significant doubt.  Cf. Hill, 649 F.3d at 263–64 (officers 
did not have reason to believe arrestee was present, because, 
among other things, police had documented another residence 
for arrestee based on a recent traffic citation, and the lead 
officer on the scene testified that he did not believe the 
arrestee would be present). 
 Nor are we persuaded that the Government met its 
burden as to Payton’s second prong, i.e., that it established 
probable cause to believe Rivera was present in the apartment 
by way of the suspicious sounds the officers heard coming 
from inside.  True, the Government's burden at this stage is 
not onerous, for the threshold determination that there is 
probable cause to believe the home is the arrestee’s residence 
not only entitles that home to lesser protections under Payton 
but also, as a logical matter, increases the likelihood the 
arrestee can be found within it.  See Payton 445 U.S. at 602 
(recognizing “that an arrest warrant requirement may afford 
less protection than a search warrant requirement”).  Thus, 
once the predicate of residency is established, that alone 
carries significant weight in establishing probable cause to 
believe the arrestee is present, necessarily reducing the 
quantum of proof needed to meet Payton’s second prong in 
the totality of the circumstances analysis. 
 Ultimately, however, that analysis must be made on a 
case-by-case basis, accounting not only for the fact that there 
is an increased likelihood the arrestee will be found in his 
own home but also for other indicia supporting law 
enforcement’s belief that the suspect is then inside.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Diaz, 491 F.3d 1074, 1078 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(officers reasonably believed that arrestee was home because 
he himself told government agents that he was usually home 
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during the day, they knew he worked at home as a mechanic, 
and when they had previously visited he was absent only 
once); Pruitt, 458 F.3d at 483 (officers had reasonable belief 
parolee was inside the residence where, among other things, 
an individual exiting the residence matched the parolee’s 
picture to the person selling drugs inside);  United States v. 
Beck, 729 F.2d 1329, 1331–32 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) 
(“Beck’s car, identified by the agents, was parked nearby; and 
it was reasonable to believe that one would be at home at 7:30 
a.m. and be sound asleep . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
 Here, because the officers lacked probable cause to 
believe Rivera lived in the home, mere signs of life inside, 
even if suspicious, could not establish probable cause to 
believe he was present and could not justify their warrantless 
entry into Vasquez-Algarin’s apartment.  Indeed, such 
bootstrapping would be clearly untenable as a logical matter, 
for law enforcement cannot compensate for the deficiency of 
the information underlying its belief that a suspect even lives 
at a particular residence by way of generic evidence 
indicating merely that someone is inside the home.  Cf. Shea 
v. Smith, 966 F.2d 127, 131 (3d Cir. 1992) (observing that 
“[i]f the police lack probable cause to believe the suspect is 
an actual resident, but have probable cause to believe he’s 
present, they must get a search warrant.” (quoting Harper, 
928 F.2d at 896)).   
 In sum, we note that on both prongs of the Payton test, 
the information that law enforcement relied upon to justify 
breaking into Vasquez-Algarin’s apartment contrasts sharply 
in kind and quantity from the information deemed sufficient 
by this Court and other Courts of Appeals applying the 
probable cause standard.  See, e.g., Veal, 453 F.3d at 168 
(officers lawfully entered the home of the arrestee’s wife 
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where the parole violation warrant indicated he was no longer 
living at his last known address and listed his wife as a 
possible lead, his former landlord reported that the couple had 
lived together in the apartment they rented from him, and the 
car the arrestee allegedly drove was registered to his wife and 
parked near her home); Route, 104 F.3d at 62–63 (officer 
confirmed that the arrestee’s credit card applications, utility 
bills and vehicle registration matched the address of the 
residence, and at the residence observed a known associate 
backing out of the driveway, another vehicle in the driveway, 
and noise coming from a television inside the home); 
Jackson, 576 F.3d at 469 (concluding “the police had enough 
evidence to easily satisfy a probable cause standard” where 
they received a tip that the arrestee was residing at a friend’s 
apartment and, on their arrival, the arrestee’s girlfriend 
confirmed he was inside). 
 Just as private citizens are provided protection from 
mistaken arrest by the requirement that law enforcement have 
probable cause to believe they committed the crime in 
question, private homes must be protected from mistaken 
entry by, at minimum, a probable cause determination as to 
whether the suspect sought even lives there.  Because the 
officers lacked information sufficient to meet that threshold in 
this case, their entry into Vasquez-Algarin’s home and the 
subsequent searches were unconstitutional, and, absent some 
exception to the exclusionary rule, the evidence they seized 
should have been suppressed.  We turn, then, to the 
Government’s argument that one such exception is 
applicable. 
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E. The good-faith exception 
The Government argues that even if officers 
unlawfully entered Vasquez-Algarin’s home, his conviction 
should stand because the exclusionary rule has no application 
and the evidence is admissible under the good-faith exception 
where law enforcement’s conduct was not “deliberate, 
reckless, or grossly negligent.”  Gov’t Br. at 24–25 (citing 
Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009)).  We are not 
persuaded on these facts by the Government’s invocation of 
the good-faith exception.   
The Supreme Court has “over time applied [the] good-
faith exception across a range of cases” where applying the 
exclusionary rule would not “yield ‘appreciable deterrence.’”  
Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2426, 2428 (2011) 
(quoting United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976)).  
For example, the Court has held that, under the good-faith 
exception, evidence need not be suppressed where police 
conduct a search in “objectively reasonable reliance” on a 
search warrant subsequently deemed invalid, United States v. 
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984), or on a statute subsequently 
held unconstitutional, Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 360 
(1987).   
Drawing on this line of cases, in Davis, the Supreme 
Court held that “[e]vidence obtained during a search 
conducted in reasonable reliance on binding precedent is not 
subject to the exclusionary rule.”  131 S. Ct. at 2429.  And in 
our en banc decision in United States v. Katzin, 769 F.3d 163 
(3d Cir. 2014), this Court, in turn, relied on Davis and the 
Supreme Court’s prior good-faith decisions to conclude that 
the exception applies not only where law enforcement agents 
act on binding appellate precedent but also, and more 
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fundamentally, where the officers act “upon an objectively 
reasonable good faith belief in the legality of their conduct.”  
Id. at 182.   
In neither respect is the exception warranted in this 
case.  First, the Government does not purport to rely on 
binding appellate precedent for its assertion that the officers 
had sufficient information to forcibly enter Vasquez-
Algarin’s home, nor could it in view of the binding Supreme 
Court authority in Payton and Steagald that points the other 
way.  Even Herring—which the Government cites not as 
binding appellate precedent on these facts but for the general 
proposition that a finding of a Fourth Amendment violation 
does not compel automatic reversal—weighs in favor of 
suppression.  Herring involved a county’s inadvertent failure 
to update its database concerning a recalled arrest warrant—
“isolated negligence attenuated from the arrest” that the Court 
determined was not “sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can 
meaningfully deter it” or “sufficiently culpable that such 
deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system.”  555 
U.S. at 137–38, 144.  In contrast, here we are confronted not 
with an inadvertent recordkeeping error but with a deliberate 
decision to force entry into a home based on only vague and 
uncorroborated information as to whether the subject of the 
arrest warrant even lived there.  The gulf between this case 
and Herring is only reinforced by Deputy Marshal Duncan’s 
trial testimony acknowledging documentation in his 
possession that caused him concern that this was a third-party 
residence for which he needed consent to search. 
We thus turn to the second and more fundamental 
inquiry we undertook in Katzin, the “objectively ascertainable 
question whether a reasonably well trained officer would 
have known that the search was illegal under all of the 
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circumstances.”  769 F.3d at 179 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 
922 n.23).  In making this determination, we consider the 
decisions set forth by the Supreme Court, our Court and our 
sister Circuits.  See id. at 182–84.  As is apparent from our 
survey of the case law, however, those decisions also favor 
suppression.   
Read together, Payton and Steagald make clear that, 
because of the sanctity of the home, nothing less than 
probable cause is appropriate when it comes to determining 
whether a home belongs to an arrestee and to undertaking a 
forced entry on the basis of an arrest warrant alone.  See 
supra Section II.A.  As for our own precedent, although we 
have clarified today that “reasonable belief” in the Payton 
context does indeed amount to probable cause, our decisions 
to date have assumed as much and used probable cause as the 
applicable standard.  See Veal, 453 F.3d at 167 n.3; Agnew, 
407 F.3d at 196.  Lastly, where this Court and our sister 
Circuits have upheld the validity of police entries into homes 
under Payton, it has been on the basis of far more specific and 
reliable information than what the officers relied upon here to 
enter Vasquez-Algarin’s apartment, see Section II.D, and 
conversely, where the only evidence available has been of 
such meager quantity and quality, the Courts of Appeals have 
held that suppression is appropriate, see, e.g., Werra, 638 
F.3d at 341; Hardin, 539 F.3d at 427.  Thus, in contrast with 
Katzin, where “[t]he constellation of circumstances that 
appeared to authorize [the officers’] conduct included well 
settled principles of Fourth Amendment law as articulated by 
the Supreme Court [and] a near-unanimity of circuit courts 
applying these principles to the same conduct,” 769 F.3d at 
182, the very opposite is true here.   
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We do not take lightly the “significant social costs of 
suppressing reliable, probative evidence.”  Id.  However, we 
are compelled to enforce the exclusionary rule where law 
enforcement officers, “at the time they acted, would have or 
should have known their [conduct] w[as] unconstitutional.”  
Id. at 179.  The Government’s argument in this case boils 
down to the proposition that law enforcement officers may 
forcibly enter a home based on nothing more than the general 
representation of another law enforcement officer and the 
vague and uncorroborated assertions of unidentified 
informants that the intended arrestee lives there.  We reject 
this position as inconsistent with fundamental Fourth 
Amendment principles and the language and logic of 
Supreme Court precedent governing in-home arrests.  Given 
the dictates of Payton and Steagald, our prior applications of 
Payton in Veal and Agnew, and the out-of-Circuit precedent 
consistently holding law enforcement to a higher bar than 
what was proffered here to justify a forced home entry, we 
conclude the officers’ conduct was, at a minimum, “grossly 
negligent,” and thus was “sufficiently deliberate that 
exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable 
that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice 
system.”  Herring, 555 U.S. at 144.   
III. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District 
Court’s denial of Vasquez-Algarin’s motion to suppress, 
vacate the conviction, and remand for proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
